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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
CRESTVIEW-HOLLADAY HOME OWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., a Utah
corporation, et al.,
PlaintiffsRespondents,
-vs-

Case No.

ENGH FLORAL COMPANY, a Utah
corporation, dba ENGH FLORAL
AND GARDEN CENTER, et al.,
DefendantsAppellants.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
SALT LAKE COUNTY

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action attacking the validity of an amendment to the zoning ordinance of Salt Lake County reclassifying
property owned by appellant Engh Floral Company located at
2098 East 3900 South from Agriculture A-l to Residential R-M
and Commercial C-2.

DISPOSITION OF THE CASE
IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court held the zoning amendment constituted
spot zoning and was therefore invalid.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant Salt Lake County seeks reversal of the
lower court's decision.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Henry Engh and his family have been engaged in the
nursery, landscaping and floral business at 2098 East 3900
South since 1932. R-75.

From the inception of the business

there has been a gift shop associated with the floral and nursery
business.

In 1932 the area was rural with very few residents in

the area.

R-95. No zoning was in effect in the area until

1953, at which time the Engh Floral property was zoned Agriculture
A-l.

At that time, Engh Floral became a non-conforming use as the

Agriculture A-l zone does not permit retail sales of nursery
products.

The evidence showed the Engh Floral business has been

very successful and has continued to expand in volume over the
years.

By 1972 its gross revenue exceeded $1,250,000.00 and it

employed 75 people.

R-75, R-88.
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The area surrounding Engh Floral has developed as a
single family residential neighborhood interspersed with a
number of commercial uses.

R-22. At the corner of 23rd East

and 39th South, which is about 600 feet from the east end of
the Engh property, there is commercial C-l and C-2 zoning
containing a Safeway store, a Sprouse-Reitz store, two service
stations, a drive-in restaurant, a bank, and several other retail
shops and businesses.

Ex. P-10, R-36.

Immediately across 39th

South Street from the Engh property are a retail egg sales outlet and a firewood sales outlet.

Ex. P-10, R-36.

On 23rd East

in the area of Engh Floral there are condominiums and Olympus
High School.

R-47.

39th South is scheduled for widening and

is not desirable for single family residential use. R-42.
On February 8, 1972, Engh Floral Company filed an
application to rezone its property consisting of a total of
approximately 13 acres from Agriculture A-l to Commercial C-3.
Ex. P-8.

The application was made because of the difficulty

that Engh Floral was having in operating under the scope of
its non-conforming use.

Ex. P-8.

C-3 zoning is the most

intense commercial use zoning under the zoning ordinances of
Salt Lake County.

R-27.

In response to the application, the

Salt Lake County Planning staff made several area studies which
included more than the Engh property.
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Ex. P-10, R-39.

During

the course of the studies the staff originally recommended
that the application for C-3 zoning be denied, suggesting
that R-M zoning be explored.

Ex. D-17, R-14-18. The final

recommendation to the Planning staff, based upon the area
studies, was to rezone the existing retail outlet of Engh Floral
from A-l to Commercial C-2 to acknowledge the existing nonconforming use and to allow Engh Floral to continue to expand
and modernize its business and to zone the remaining ground
from A-l to Residential R-M as a buffer between the commercial
business and the single family residential area adjacent to the
Engh property.

R-39. At the suggestion of the staff, Engh

Floral amended its application to conform to the staff's recommendation and the staff recommended approval of the amended
application.

R-39, R-40.

On May 2, 1972, the Salt Lake County Planning Commission
unanimously recommended approval of the amended application.
Ex. D-2, R-41.

On August 16, 1973, the Board of County

Commissioners of Salt Lake County followed the recommendation of
the Planning Commission and approved the amended zoning application by a 2 to 1 vote.

Ex. D-4.

This action was taken after

the Salt Lake County Commission had adopted the Big Cottonwood
Master Plan which was done by Williams & Mocine, a regional
planning consulting firm from San Francisco.
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Ex. D-20, R-44.

The master plan showed the Engh Floral property as commercial
and residential R-M.

Ex. D-20.

On October 15, 1973, respondents filed this action
challenging the validity of the zoning amendment for Engh
Floral.

At trial, which was held on the 16th day of January,

1974, respondents offered no evidence that the rezoning would
affect the value or use of any of respondents1 properties.
R-6.

Despite this fact the court held respondents had standing

to maintain the lawsuit and invalidated the zoning. T-153.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
RESPONDENTS HAD NO STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE VALIDITY OF THE
ZONING AMENDMENT BECAUSE THEY FAILED TO SHOW THAT IT AFFECTED
THE VALUE OF THEIR PROPERTY.
In order to have standing to challenge the validity
of a zoning regulation, the general rule is that a neighboring
property owner must demonstrate that the zoning amendment he
seeks to enjoin will adversely affect the use of his property.
Where plaintiffs have failed to plead and show damages from the
rezoning of nearby property, their cases have been dismissed.
In Ratner v. City of Richmond, 201 N.E.2d 49, 53 (Ind. 1964),
the court dismissed plaintiff's complaint in a suit to enjoin
the enforcement of a zoning amendment which allowed a shopping
center.

The court stated:
-5-

"The complainant must show that enforcement
of the ordinance will affect his personal
or property rights and that it will cause
him personal, direct and irreparable
injury and not merely that he suffers in some
indefinite way in common with people
generally."
In Housing Authority of City of Melbourne v. Richardson, 196
So.2d 489, 492 (Fla. 1967), the court reached a similar result.
In that case the plaintiffs failed to plead any damage from a
zoning amendment allowing a low rent housing project near their
property.

The court reversed the lower court's failure to dis-

miss the complaint, stating:
"While it is not proper for plaintiffs to
plead evidence, it is necessary that they
plead with some specificity using ultimate
facts to show the relationship of plaintiffs'
property to Brooker Heights and just how
they will be adversely affected by the zoning
ordinance. (citations omitted) In the
instant case we are not apprised as to how
or what degree plaintiffs will be adversely
affected, if at all. Thus, the complaint
is insufficient because it does not appear the
plaintiffs have standing in either capacity
to complain of defendant's actions."
Numerous other cases have been dismissed because of the plaintiffs'
failure either to plead damage from the rezoning or to show
damage at trial.

Parcesepe v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Town

of Goshen, 221 A.2d 270 (Conn. 1966); Kalvaitis v. Port Chester,
235 N.Y.S.2d 44 (1962); Haber v. Board of Estimate, 305 N.Y.S.2d
520 (1969); S. A. Lynch Investment Corp. v. Miami, 151 So.2d
858 (Fla. App. 1963).
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Respondents, in their brief to the lower court,
made the general statement that nearby residents of land
rezoned have standing to maintain a lawsuit to challenge a
zoning amendment.

To support their position respondents quote

from 37 A.L.R.2d 1143, which digests many of the cases dealing
with the issue of standing to challenge the rezoning of a
neighbor's property.

The quotation from the A.L.R. article

reads as follows:
"The general conclusion to be drawn from
the cases is that an owner of real estate
which is subject to zoning regulations has
sufficient legal standing to challenge as
invalid or void, whether for arbitrariness,
unreasonableness, capriciousness, or other
cause, an ordinance rezoning or reclassifying neighboring land, or altering the
amending zoning regulations affecting the
same, where the changes would inflict on
the first mentioned owner a special and
peculiar injury. Regarding the latter
statement, it ordinarily seems to be sufficient to allege and show that plaintiff's
property would be substantially depreciated
by the matters complained of, and the courts
evidently being inclined to assume, absent
contrary indications, that all other property of the zone, municipality, or neighborhood, or the property thereof generally would
not also be substantially depreciated by the
changes." (emphasis added)
Respondents ignore the requirement of the law emphasized in
the above quotation that a party must "allege and show" damage
to his property from the rezoning of neighboring property to
have standing to challenge the rezoning.

They offered abso-

lutely no evidence that the rezoning would affect the value or
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use of any of their properties.

R-6.

The only evidence

appellants offered relevant to standing was the proximity of
property owned by members of the association to the Engh
property.

However, courts have rejected the contention that

mere proximity of a person's property to rezoned property
establishes standing to attack the rezoning.

In 222 East

Chestnut Street Corp. v. Board of Appeals, 152 N.E.2d 465
(111. 1958), a case similar to this one, the plaintiff therein
failed to offer evidence of any damage from the rezoning of
adjacent property for a parking lot, claiming that proximity
of his property to the rezoned property was sufficient.

The

court in that case first noted the general rule for standing
to attack an ordinance rezoning neighboring property:
"The law is well settled that the right to
review a final administrative decision is
limited to those parties to the proceeding
before the administrative agency whose rights,
privileges, or duties are affected by the
decision. In recently applying this
principle in zoning litigation to which the
present plaintiff was also a party, we held
it is incumbent upon the party seeking review
to both allege and prove that the Board's
decision would in fact adversely affect such
party. (citations omitted) This is in accord
with the majority view which holds that the
right to maintain a suit in such cases
depends upon whether the zoning inflicts a
special or peculiar injury upon the party
bringing the suit." 152 N.E.2d at 466.
The court then stated that plaintiff must prove injury to his
property from the rezoning of neighboring property:
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"The complaint for administrative review
clearly alleges that the effect of the
Board's decision will be to cause injury,
damage and depreciation in value of
plaintiff's property, but the problem of
its right to maintain an action resolves
itself into a question of whether such
allegations find support in the proof."
The court went on to reject plaintiff's contention that mere
proximity of his property to the property rezoned relieved him
from showing damage to his property:
"Here there is a complete absence of proof
relating to the value of plaintiff's property and of the effect the parking lot will
have on such values. It is true, as
plaintiff suggests, that the proximity
of certain uses will depreciate the rental
value of nearby property, but we have found
no authority holding that the mere showing
of the existence of such uses relieves a
party from affirmatively proving the alleged
damage to his property. We conclude, therefore, that we may not take judicial notice of
the matters prayed and that there is a
complete failure of proof to support the
allegations of special injury made in the
plaintiff's complaint." 152 N.E.2d at 467.
The contention that mere proximity to the land rezoned
was sufficient to show standing was also rejected in the case of
Kyser v. Board of Appeals of Westport, 230 A.2d 595, 598
(Conn. 1967).

In that case, the immediate neighbors of a

property owner who had been granted a variance by the Zoning
Board of Appeals brought an action challenging the variance.
The lower court dismissed the complaint because the plaintiffs
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failed to offer any evidence that they are aggrieved by the
decision of the Board of Appeals.

The Supreme Court of

Connecticut upheld the decisionf stating:
"The Kysers urged that to prove aggrievement it was unnecessary for them to
establish more than the fact that they were
owners of property adjoining that for which
the variance was granted. Although it is
undoubtedly true that many, if not most,
cases the owner of property adjoining that
for which a variance has been granted is
able to prove aggrievement, proximity alone
does not establish it. Here, the question
of aggrievement was put in issue by the
pleadings and the Kysers make no claim that
aside from proving the proximity of their
premises. There is nothing in the record
or the appendix to the brief of the Kysers
to show that the value of their property
would be specifically lessened or any other
property or legal right of theirs would be
specifically and injuriously affected by
the granting of the variance."
In the case herein the lower court in its memorandum
decision concluded that respondents had "standing since special
damages would be sustained".

However, the record is void of

any evidence of damage to plaintiffs from the zoning amendment,
and the court made no finding of fact or conclusion of law
concerning standing.

For these reasons appellant Salt Lake

County submits the lower court erred in not dismissing plaintiffs1 complaint after trial on the grounds of lack of standing.
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POINT II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ZONING ORDINANCE
REZONING ENGH FLORAL CONSTITUTED A SPOT ZONE.
The concept of a spot zone generally involves a
case where a small tract of land is rezoned, granting it special
privileges inconsistent with the zoning in the area and not
pursuant to a zoning or master plan for the area. Marshall v.
Salt Lake City, 105 Utah 111, 141 P.2d 704 (1943).

However, the

Marshall case noted that zoning districts need not "be confined
and rigidly limited to one particular use" and upheld zoning for
small business areas within a residential area as long as such
zoning was based upon some reasonable zoning plan.

Numerous

other cases have also held that small commercial areas may be
properly located within residential districts.

Rust v. City

of Eugene, Oregon, 74 P.2d 374 (Ore. 1971); Levinsky v. Zoning
Comm. of Bridgeport, 127 A.2d 872 (Conn. 1966); Bishop v.
Board of Zoning Appeals, 53 A.2d 659 (N.J. 1947).

In the latter

case, a case similar to the case herein because it involved a
business use prior to the original zoning which was later zoned
commercial constituting it the only business area in a large
residential area, the court rejected the contention that the
zoning was not done pursuant to a plan, stating:
"The city adopted such a plan. To permit
business in a small area within a residential zone may fall within its scope and
to do so, unless it amounts to unreasonable
or arbitrary action, is not unlawful."
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The case herein differs from cases invalidating
commercial zoning within residential areas as spot zoning in
several important respects.

In cases which have struck down

zoning on the grounds of spot zoning, the courts have found
that the zoning was solely for the benefit of the property
owner, not pursuant to a general plan for the area.

In this

case the testimony showed that the rezoning of Engh Floral
property was done as part of a general plan for the area to
provide a proven need for the commercial business of Engh Floral
in the area and to attempt to resolve problems between the
existing commercial use of Engh Floral and the residential
neighbors.

R-39.

Mr. Clayne Ricks, the Planning Director

for Salt Lake County, testified that the Planning staff recommended the C-2 zoning on the basis that acknowledgment of the
existing commercial use would allow Engh Floral to continue its
business and to grow and compete.

R-39.

This is certainly in

the interest of the community as Engh Floral is a thriving
business, providing a needed service and employing 75 people.
The plan creates a buffer between the commercial use and the
single family residential uses in the area by providing an area
for a higher residential use between Engh Floral and the single
family homes.

However, the rezoning in itself does not permit

other commercial uses on the property because all commercial uses
on a tract of land over one acre need conditional use approval
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which is discretionary with the Planning Commission, R-57.
The rezoning plan eliminates the continuing problem as to the
scope of Engh Floral's non-conforming use. Mr. Ricks testified
that R-M zoning is often used as a buffer between commercial
uses and single family homes.

R-64. The rezoning of the land

into a residential R-M zone provides the possibility of condominiums in the area for people who may wish to sell their homes
but would like to stay in the immediate area. R-59-60.
The Planning staff put a considerable amount of time
and study into the problem and reached their final recommendation
after considering several alternatives.

The effect of the

decision of the lower court is to substitute its judgment for
the judgment of County planning experts as to reasonableness of
its zoning plan.

This decision is contrary to the rule laid

down by this court in prior zoning cases as to the limited
judicial review of a zoning plan.

This rule was noted in the

Marshall case:
"A zoning plan should not be jettisoned
merely because it may be vulnerable to
attack from one of these pillboxes. It
must be considered as a whole to see if
it's designed to accomplish such a
purpose; even if it could promote the
general welfare or even if it is reasonably debatable that it is in the
interest of the general welfare, the
act should be upheld . . . ." 141
P.2d at 709.
That a zoning plan should be upheld by the court unless arbitrary
or capricious has been reiterated in numerous other zoning cases.
See Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corp., 17 U.2d 300, 410 P.2d 764
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(1966); Dowse v. Salt Lake City Corp., 123 Utah 107, 255 P.2d
723 (1953); Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity v. Salt Lake City, 116
Utah 536, 212 P.2d 177 (1949).
The Engh case differs from spot zoning cases in other
ways.

Most spot zoning cases involved solely a small proposed

commercial area in an exclusive residential neighborhood.

The

Engh property is not located in an exclusive residential area,
but rather, on 39th South, a street containing many commercial
uses within the immediate area, including commercial zoning within
a short distance of the Engh property.

The Engh property is not

a small parcel, but rather, contains approximately 13 acres.
Rarely have the courts found spot zoning where the parcel rezoned
is that large. A survey of the size of parcels where spot zoning
was alleged is reported in 3 Anderson, American Law of Zoning,
§5.07, pp. 253-254:
"It seems clear that the size of the area
figured predominately in the outcome of
the litigation.
"An alignment of cases examining preparation of this chapter supports the same
premise. Among the cases where the exact
size of the area could be determined from
the decision, spot zoning was detected in
some amendments which reclassified parcels
ranging in size from single lot to 13 acre
tract. But nearly all amendments affecting
parcels of three acres or less were disapproved. In sharp contrast, cases in which the
spot zoning argument was rejected involved
tracts of 11 acres or more with few exceptions.
Small area changes were approved where other
factors than the size seemed critical to the
court."
Thus, the R-M zoning should not have been struck down by the
lower court even if it held, contrary to the majority decisions
-14-

in other jurisdictions, that acknowledgment of an existing
commercial use was not an appropriate reason for approving the
C-2 zoning for the Engh property.

Even the original staff

recommendation suggested the possibility of R-M zoning for this
large parcel on 39th South.
POINT III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE REZONING OF THE ENGH
PROPERTY WAS A SPOT ZONE BECAUSE IT WAS DONE TO ACKNOWLEDGE A
NON-CONFORMING USE.
The lower court in its memorandum decision concluded
that rezoning of the Engh property was a spot zone since it was
done to acknowledge a non-conforming use.

However, the majority

of courts have not even applied the rule of spot zoning to the
acknowledgment of existing non-conforming uses.

This exception

to the rule is stated as follows in 62 C.J.S. 226, §12, p. 468:
"The reclassification of certain property
for a use different from that of the surrounding areas is not invalid, where such
property was subject to a non-conforming
use, the effect of which was the same as
though the property had been originally
classified for the use to which it was
subsequently changed." See Chayt v. Maryland Jockey Club, 18 A.2d 858 (Md. 1941);
Keller v. Council Bluffs, 66 N.W.2d 113
(Iowa 1954); Goddard v. Stowers, 272 S.W.2d
400 (Tex. 1954).
In the Goddard case cited above, the court upheld a
zoning amendment of property from residential to commercial
to acknowledge a non-conforming grocery and filling station
which had existed 10 years. The court rejected the contention
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that the rezoning constituted spot zoning, stating:
"Neither do we have a case of unjustifiable spot zoning, the issue being
ostensibly raised by appellants but
not in fact, defendant's governing body
simply decided in view of the great
increase of population of the named
highways, especially since 1951 . . .
that the store's location and nonconforming use be legalized . . . ."
The facts in the case herein are similar to facts in
the Goddard case.

The population in the area of Engh Floral

has greatly increased in the past few years and 39th South has
become a very busy street justifying the need for commercial
zoning on 39th South which would acknowledge a successful nonconforming use.
CONCLUSION
The standing issue in this case is of critical
importance, not only for the disposition to this case, but
also for the precedent it will establish in future cases of a
similar nature.

The effect of the lower court's decision is

that no evidence of standing need be shown to attack the rezoning
of another person's property.

This holding is contrary to the

established law in this area which requires that a person must
have some special interest in a law to bring a lawsuit attacking
the validity of the law.

Because respondents have failed to

meet this basic requirement for attacking a zoning ordinance
by offering some evidence of affect on their property by the
rezoning of the Engh property, appellant Salt Lake County submits

that the lower court's decision should be reversed.
If this court upholds the lower court's decision that
respondents have standing to bring this lawsuit, then appellant
Salt Lake County submits that the lower court erred in holding
that the zoning was arbitrary and capricious.

As in most

controversial zoning cases, there appears to have been no perfect
solution to the problem of the application of Engh Floral to
have its property rezoned from A-l to C-3.

The decision of the

Planning staff, after considerable study of the facts, to
recommend denial of the original application of Engh Floral and
to recommend instead C-2 and R-M zoning is a reasonable solution
to a difficult problem.

The lower court had to completely

ignore the record to have found that this solution was arbitrary
and capricious and for this reason appellant Salt Lake County
asks that the lower court's decision be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Salt Lake County Attorney
DONALD SAWAYA
Chief Civil Deputy County Attorney
KENT S. LEWIS
Deputy County Attorney
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants
Salt Lake County/ Ralph Y. McClure,
William E. Dunn and Pete Kutulas
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